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II. PUBLIC LAW
Alvin B. Rubin*
TAXATION

Property Tax Exemptions-Charitable Enterprises
The Louisiana Constitution provides that "places devoted
to charitable undertakings" shall be exempt from taxation.' In
State ex rel. United Seamen's Service, Incorporated v. City of
New Orleans,2 the court applied the rule that the fact that an
institution primarily charitable in nature makes a small charge
for its services to those able to pay does not deprive that institution of its constitutional exemption. The charitable organization held entitled to exemption was the United Seamen's Service,
a non-trading corporation organized under the laws of New
York, to foster the welfare of personnel of the merchant marine.
The United Seamen's Service operated hotels in New Orleans at
which it furnished recreational and charitable services, and in
which it furnished rooms and food at no charge to indigent seamen and at a "small charge" to those able to pay. The result is
in accord with the earlier Louisiana rule,3 and the prevailing
view in other jurisdictions.'
The involuteness and overlapping of the complicated Louisiana tax statutes was illustrated, however, by the substantial
portion of the court's opinion which was required to dispose of
exceptions of prescription urged under three separate statutes.
The taxes in dispute had been levied in 1944, 1945, and were
listed on the assessment rolls for 1946. Act 227 of 19365 requires
that suits to challenge the correctness of an assessment be brought
before January 19th of the year in which the assessment is to
become effective, or within thirty days after filing of the assessment rolls, whichever is later. The court stated that this statute
''seems to refer only to a suit to correct an assessment so far as
the valuation of the property is concerned." 6 But the court held
that, if the act purports to apply also to suits in which the con*Part-time Assistant Professor of Law,
1. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 4(2).

Louisiana State University.

2. 209 La. 797, 25 So. (2d) 596 (1946).
3. State ex rel. Cunningham v. Board of Assessors, 52 La. Ann. 223, 26 So.

872 (1898).
4. 51 Am. Jur. § 602 (verbo "Taxation"). See also the extensive annotations in 34 A.L.R. 637 (1925); 62 A. L. R. 330 (1929); 108 A.L.R. 286 (1937);
29 LR.A. (N.S.) 190 (1911); 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1197 (1914).
5. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8345.
6. 209 La. 797, 802, 25 So. (2d) 596, 597 (1946).
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stitutionality of an assessment is at issue, it would be unconstitutional, for the legislature cannot limit the time within which
a suit may be brought to declare property which is constitutionally exempt from taxation improperly assessed.
The rule of unconstitutionality was applied also to the applicability of Act 39 of 1922, 7 which requires suits (in the Parish
of Orleans, as now limited 8) to challenge "legality" of an assessment to be brought within sixty days after the date of filing the
tax rolls, and not before the date of filing. The doctrine that the
legislature may not prescribe a reasonable prescriptive period,
even for a suit testing constitutionality, is of doubtful soundness;9
but this is not its first appearance, and it is likely to remain with
us.,*
An argument for the exception of prescription based on Act
18 of the Second Extra Session of 193411 was also dismissed. The
court held that statute applicable only to suits to correct changes
in assessments made by the Louisiana Tax Commission.
Property Tax Exemptions-Mineral Wells
The Louisiana Constitution authorizes a severance tax on
natural resources and provides that "No further or additional
tax . . .shall be levied . . .upon oil, gas, or sulphur leases or
right, (sic) nor shall any additional value be added to the assessment of land, by reason of the presence of oil, gas or sulphur
therein ....,,12
The Louisiana Tax Commission has construed this
provision to permit ad valorem property taxation of materials incorporated into the well, and machinery and equipment used in
operating the well, and has instructed assessment accordingly.8
In Meyers v. Flournoy," plaintiff, who had paid an ad valorem tax assessed on oil well machinery, equipment, casing, and
kindred items, under protest, sought return of the sums paid on
the ground that the assessment was violative of the Louisiana
7. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8363-8365.
8. See La. Act 97 of 1924 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8360-83621.
9. See 34 Am. Jr. § 15 (verbo "Limitation of Actions"). See also Metcalf
v. Watertown, 153 U.S. 671, 14 S. Ct. 947, 38 L.Ed. 861 (1894); Hawkins v. Barney, 30 U.S. 457, 8 L.Ed. 190 (1831); Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Comptroller, 177 U.S. 318, 20 S.Ct. 642, 44 L.Ed. 786 (1900). While these cases are not
directly in point, their reasoning would appear decisive.
10. See Taylor Bros. Iron Works Co., Ltd. v. City of New Orleans, 44 La.
Ann. 554, 11 So. 3 (1892); Soniat v. Board of State Affairs, 146 La. 450, 83 So.
760 (1920).
11. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8324.1-8324.9.
12. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 21.
13. Louisiana Tax Commission, Second Biennial Report (1942-43) 220-223.
14. 209 La. 812, 25 So. (2d) 601 (1946).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VII

constitutional provision quoted above. The court held that this
provision was in the nature of an exception, although not listed
in the section of the Constitution stating that "The following
property, and no other, shall be exempt from taxation .... -;15
that exemptions must be unequivocally established;1 6 that the
property assessed had not been shown to be included in the constitutional exemption; and that the property was therefore taxable.
Tax Sales
The well settled rule that a tax sale is null where there is
no notice to the owners of the seizure and intended sale, 17 was
applied in La Plaq Realty Company v. Vaughan.' Although the
tax sale in that case was made under Louisiana Act 161 of 1934,
which was temporary legislation affording delinquent tax debtors
an opportunity to redeem their lands by paying the taxes due
in five annual instalments, the court held that a seizure upon
default in that redemption scheme was required by implication
to be preceded by notice, although notice was not expressly
required by that particular statute.
Authority of Collector of Revenue to Adopt Regulations
The State Income Tax Law authorizes deductions from gross
income for operating expenses. 19 It also provides for "a reasonable allowance" for depletion or depreciation of mineral resources, "under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the"
collector of revenue. 20 These provisions are identical with provisions in the Federal Revenue Acts of 1932 and 1934.21 In Standard Oil Company v. Collector of Revenue,22 the collector of revenue sought to sustain his authority to adopt a regulation pro15. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 4.
16. Citing Hibernia National Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 195 La.
43, 196 So. 15 (1940), noted in (1941) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 115; Standard
Oil Co. v. Fontenot, 198 La. 644, 4 So.(2d) 634 (1941); State v. Pittsburg Testing Lab. Corp., 203 La. 147, 13 So.(2d) 710 (1943).
17. See the numerous cases cited by the court, 209 La. 481, 492, 24 So.(2d)
870, 874 (1946). The defect is, however, subject to "cure" by the constitutional prescriptive period. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 11. See Skannal v.
Hespeth, 196 La. 87, 198 So. 661 (1940); Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Dalferes, 138
La. 507, 70 So. 493 (1916).
18. 209 La. 481, 24 So.(2d) 870 (1946).

19. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 9(a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.9(a)].
20. Id. at § 9(m) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.9(m)].
21. 47 Stat. 169 (1932), 48 Stat. 680 (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 23 (1940).
22. 27 So.(2d) 268 (La. 1946). The case of O'Meara v. Collector of Revenue,
27 So.(2d) 275 (La. 1946) involved the same issue, and was decided at the
same time.
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mulgated in 1938,28 requiring that expenses in drilling a mineral
well be capitalized, and not treated as current operating expenses of the driller. The court, adopting the opinion of the trial
judge, held that, since the provisions of the act were taken verbatim from the federal law, the act included all of the authoritative interpretations and constrictions previously placed on the
statute. The court found that "the Federal act, together with the
regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue,"'"
permitted the taxpayer, at his option, to capitalize or to deduct
as operating expenses intangible drilling costs. Therefore, went
the reasoning, "it was the intention of the Legislature that such
meaning be given the Louisiana Act." The collector showed that
this was his interpretation by failing to adopt a contrary regulation until 1938. The legislature intended to give the collector
authority to adopt regulations only for the purpose of clarifying
ambiguities; there was no ambiguity here. The federal regulations had so impregnated the act as to become an integral part
of it, with the result that it is the law, not the regulation, which
grants the taxpayer the option.
Apparently, the case reaches the anomalous result that, although the federal regulations might be changed to adopt the
very rule applied by the Louisiana regulations, the Louisiana
regulations could not be changed despite identical phraseology
in the statutory grants of authority. However, the court found
''no merit" in an argument based on that reasoning: "whether
the Federal interpretation is irrevocable or not (was) not pertinent to the decision of this case. '2 5 Even "the question of
whether the administrative interpretation of the Federal authorities granting the option is contrary to the provisions of the
.. .Act and therefore incapable of being incorporated into an
identical provision of the Louisiana . . .statute (was) not an
issue in this case and need not be decided.
."26
State Income Tax
In Torlicht v. Collector of Revenue,27 the taxation problem
was confined to the question of whether certain admitted income
of the plaintiff, a married woman, was community or separate
property. Plaintiff-taxpayer contended that the income was com23.
1938).
24.
25.
26.
27.

Art. 107, Rules and Regulations of Collector of Revenue (November
Italics supplied.
27 So.(2d) 269, 274 (La. 1946).
Ibid.
209 La. 167, 24 So.(2d) 366 (1945).
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munity property. The amount in dispute was less than the jurisdictional amount of the supreme court.28 The court found no
question of the "constitutionality or legality"2 of the tax involved, and transferred the case to the court of appeal, in accordance with procedural principles elsewhere discussed. 0
State Estate Tax
The Federal Revenue Act of 192681 imposing the federal
estate tax contained a provision allowing credit to taxpayers for
the amounts paid in death taxes to any state, subject to a maximum credit of eighty per cent of the amount of the federal tax.
In 1932, Louisiana joined the procession of states who had raised
their death taxes to collect the maximum allowable as a credit
by the federal tax, by adopting Act 119 of 1932. 8 2 This statute
imposed an estate tax amounting to the difference between "80%
of the estate tax payable to the United States under the provisions of the . .. Federal Revenue Act of 1926" and the amounts
actually paid in state taxes. When the federal Internal Revenue
Code was adopted in 1939, 83 it replaced the earlier federal revenue laws, but the Louisiana statute was not amended to change
the tax expressly from its basis on the 1926 Federal Revenue
Act to a basis founded on the Internal Revenue Code.
In Succession of Edenborn v. Flournoy," the plaintiff contended that, as to a decedent who died in 1944, the tax imposed
by the Louisiana Act of 1932 was inapplicable on the ground
that the Louisiana Act became "ineffective and invalid" with
repeal of the Federal Revenue Act of 1926. The court required
no citation of authority to dismiss the plaintiff's contention. The
intention of the state legislature was to obtain the benefit of the
federal credit; the Louisiana act should be construed liberally
for that purpose; and the reference to the number of the federal
statute was merely inserted for convenience "in order that the
law could be easily located." The Internal Revenue Code continued the eighty per cent credit, and the fact that Congress saw
fit to codify the federal tax law "would not have any effect on
the Louisiana Statute."
The decision is undoubtedly in keeping with the legislative
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
See La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
See p. 275.
44 Stat. 69 (1926), 26 U.S.C.A. § 800 et seq. (1940).
Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8581-8586.
53 Stat. 1 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (1940).
209 La. 174, 24 So.(2d) 368 (1945).
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intention, and fills what might otherwise have been an inconvenient reduction in the state's revenue25
Apparently, no argument has yet been raised for unconstitutionality of the 1932 act as violating that provision of the
Louisiana constitution which requires that the legislature "in
all cases recite at length the several provisions of the laws it may
enact," 8 or as an unconstitutional delegation of powers. Such an
attack should be fruitless, since there is considerable authority
for the validity of the convenient method of hinging a statute
on the operation of another law in relation to the delegation
question"7 and since the Louisiana constitutional provision was
designed, not to prevent such legislation, but only to bar adoption of the common law, or large segments of it, by general legislative enactments.3 8
Rank of State Tax Liens
The frequently litigated question of the rank of tax liens
relative to previously recorded mortgages arose once more during
the last term. The Uniform Tax Procedure Act provides that
"the liability arising under any State Tax Law .

.

. shall operate

as a lien, privilege and mortgage on all of the property of the
tax debtor, both movable and immovable,

. .

. provided that the

lien, privilege and mortgage created by this section shall affect
third parties only from date of recordation, and provided further
that the said lien, privilege and mortgage shall take their respective ranks by virtue of recordation." 39 In the case of Oil Well
Supply Company v. Red Iron Drilling Company,40 the state contended that judgments for power, severance, and corporation franchise taxes should enjoy priority on the proceeds of sale of a tax
debtor's property over the claim of a mortgagee whose mortgage
was recorded prior to the date of recordation of the tax judgments.
Under authority of the statute it was held that the state's
claim ranked only from the date of recordation. In arriving at
35. See Horack, Cases and Materials on Legislation (1940) 476-481, c. V,
§ 2, on the questions of statutory interpretation involved.
36. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 18.
37. See Gellhorn, Cases and Comments on Administrative Law (1940) 216,
note, Delegation of Power to Other Sovereignties.
38. See Smith, The Louisiana Criminal Code (1942) 5 LOUISIANA LAW
REvIEw 1, 2; Morrow, The 1942 Louisiana Criminal Code in 1945: A Small
Voice From the Past (1945) 19 Tulane L. Rev. 483, 485.
39. La. Act 265 of 1940, § 3, as amended by La. Act 157 of 1942 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8422.31. The act is discussed in (1940) 3 LOUISIANA
LAW REvi w 94.
40. 210 La. 222, 26 So.(2d) 726 (1946).
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this conclusion the court cast out the cases of HiberniaMortgage
Company v. Greco"i and State v. J. Bodenger Realty Company,.
Limited,'2 as "valueless as authority" on the question involved
since the Uniform Tax Procedure Act had been enacted since
the dates of decision in the cases.' 3 The reasoning of the court
affords some insight into the attitude which is likely to be adopted
regarding related questions. It was stated in the opinion that the
mere levying of a tax creates no lien; but that only recordation
of the appropriate statement sworn to by the proper officer creates the lien. It was further noted that a judgment for taxes did
not "merge" the lien unless the lien was expressly mentioned.
Therefore, the constitutional prescriptive period of three years"
applies to the lien, although, if a personal judgment against the
tax debtor is secured, the judgment would be subject to the
longer prescriptive period of ten years. 45
The case illustrates another incident of the conflict between
the governmental need for security for the collection of tax obligations and the individual citizen's requirement of certainty
against hidden incumbrances in dealing with property. The Uniform Tax Procedure Act resolved that question for the time being
and the court clearly carries the statutory policy into execution
in a fashion which should be welcome to the many who filed
briefs as amici curiae in the HiberniaMortgage Company case,"
with the aim of protecting the interests of large lending agencies
throughout the state.
Rank of Federal Tax Liens
The only question presented for decision in Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University v. Hart47 was whether United
States liens for income taxes and penalties primed an earlier attachment by a creditor of the tax debtor. The income tax liens
had arisen after the attachment, but before judgment was rendered maintaining it. Relying on the principle that an attachment lien, when recognized by judgment, relates back to the
date of seizure, and primes any later incumbrances,48 and on the
41. 191 La. 658, 186 So. 60 (1939), noted in (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAw RuvMW 110.

42. 195 La. 1014, 197 So. 741 (1940), noted in (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAw Reviw 338.
43. 26 So.(2d) 726, 730 (La. 1946).
44. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 19.
45. See 26 So.(2d) 726, 729-730 (La. 1946).
46. Note 41, supra.
.47. 210 La. 78, 26 So.(2d) 361 (1946).
48. See Art. 722, La. Code of Prac. of 1870; Arts, 3184, 8185, La. Civil Code
of 1870. And see also the cases cited by the court at 26 So.(2d) 361, 365.
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principle that the federal income tax lien is primed by prior
mortgages, 9 equitable liens, and incumbrances, ° the court held
the seizing creditor entitled to priority.
Suits to Recover Taxes-Payment under Protest Prerequisite
Louisiana has no statutory provision comparable to the federal provision that payment of taxes under protest is not a prerequisite to a suit for recovery. 51 Consequently, it is well settled
that he who pays without protest loses his right to sue.53 In A.
Sulka & Company v. New Orleans5 3 this rule was applied. The
court held that the "saving clauses" in a later statute 54 did not
affect the rule so as to abrogate the requirement of payment
under protest.
Tax Sales-Peremption of Attack
The Louisiana Constitution provides that
"No sale of property for taxes shall be set aside for any cause
except on proof of payment of the taxes for which the property was sold prior to the date of the sale, unless the proceeding to annul is instituted ...within five years from the date of
the recordation of the tax deed. ..."
This peremptive period does not begin to accrue so long as the
owner remains in possession of the property, 6 on the judicial
theory that "His continuing in possession, notwithstanding the
sale, operates as a continuous protest against the sale."57
In Westover Realty Company, Incorporated v. State5 8 the
plaintiff brought a suit to annul a tax sale for various alleged
defects, some fourteen years after the adjudication to the state.
The state pleaded the constitutional peremptive period to the
satisfaction of the court which saw "no reason why the state as
well as an individual tax purchaser can not, in proper cases,
avail itself of the peremption. . . ." In point of fact the court
49. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 63 S.Ct. 297, 87 L.Ed. 304
(1943).
50. New York Casualty Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1944);
Exchange National Bank of Tulsa v. Davy, 13 F.Supp. 226 (N.D. Okla. 1936).
51. 1 R.C. § 3772 (1942).
52. See the many cases cited at 208 La. 585, 592, 23 So.(2d) 224, 226 (1945).
53. 208 La. 585, 23 So.(2d) 224 (1945).
54. La. Act 330 of 1938, amending and re-enacting La. Act 16 of 1934
(2 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8444.1-8444.3].
55. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 11.
56. See Levenberg v. Shanks, 165 La. 419, 115 So. 641 (1928); Hargrove
v. Davis, 178 So. 198 (La. App. 1938), and the authorities cited in both cases.
57. Westover Realty Co. v. State, 208 La. 163, 170, 23 So.(2d) 33, 35 (1945).
58. Ibid.
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saw little merit in plaintiff's allegations of defects in the tax
sale, and found the evidence of plaintiff's continuous possession,
by which the plaintiff sought to suspend operation of the peremptive period too "vague, indefinite and uncertain."
This is as it should be. There should come a limit to the time
during which a taxpayer can challenge a tax sale for insubstantial defects, if he be permitted to challenge for such defects at
all. Certainly five years is time enough for him to discover what
has happened. And the state should be as legally capable of
pleading the constitutional defense as any private party. Nor is
the taxpayer left remediless. He may redeem his property under
Act 175 of 1934,19 as the court suggested, by the simple expedient
of paying the taxes and charges due on it. Taxes for fourteen
years may be substantial. If they prove too costly, the taxpayer
always has the final option of forgetting the matter.
Tax Sales-Notice
In the case of Alba v. Holstead,"" the court applied the well
settled rules that notice must be given a delinquent taxpayer
prior to a tax sale of his property and that notice mailed to an
incorrect address is not sufficient, at least where the correct address "could readily have been secured." 61
Severance Tax
The collector of revenue failed in efforts to increase the
state's income from the severance tax in Shell Oil Company, Incorporated v. Fontenot. 2 That case involved technical processes
of oil production, outlined with clarity in the opinion. The plaintiff operated several oil and gas wells in adjacent oil fields. It
piped gas from a gas well to a nearby oil well, pumped the gas
into the oil well, and "lifted" the oil by means of the gas pressure. This gas, together with other gas produced by the oil well,
was "flared" into the atmosphere, that is, burned, in flames familiar to all Louisianians.
The collector sought to exact the severance tax on the gas
imported for. this purpose. Shell Oil Company paid under protest
and sued for recovery. Although the tax was imposed under the
Severance Tax Act of 1935,3 counsel for both sides conceded
59. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8466.
60. 208 La. 301, 23 So.(2d) 100 (1945).
61. The court cites eleven of the many Louisiana cases In point.
62. 208 La. 234, 23 So.(2d) 57 (1945).
63. La. Act 24 of 1935 (2 E.S.), as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8523,
8526, 8526(M) (U)].
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that the legislature's attempted clarification of the measure of
the severance tax act in 194264 governed decision of the case. But
the "clarification" was not clear enough to bar argument. It stated
that gas "injected into the earth" should be excluded and that in
determining the quantity of gas . . . there shall also be excluded
gas produced from oil wells and flared or vented directly into
the atmosphere."65
The gas used by Shell Oil Company, however, was not injected into the earth, literally speaking. It was injected into a
metal casing. Obviously, .such an objection by the collector was
too technical to hold water-or gas. But neither, he argued, was
it "produced from oil wells" except indirectly, nor was it flared
"directly" into the atmosphere.
The aphorism that "exemptions are strictly construed" was
ignored. Instead the court found that, at least the second time it
arose, the gas was "produced from an oil well." It was returned
to the earth, not "ultimately severed," in the words of the statute.
And it was vented into the air "directly" thereafter. Whether or
not this is a waste of the state's natural resources is not, "primarily," a matter for the judiciary.
The collector, after the fashion of Law Review writers, propounded a hypothet: Suppose the gas had been piped from a
long distance, or even purchased on the commercial market.
Would its later use, as outlined above, make it tax exempt? But
the court was not to be beguiled; "in this case we are not concerned with the piping of gas a great distance, or from one section of the state to another, with an appreciable period of time
intervening." What that has to do with the matter, in view of the
court's interpretation, is not clear. The tax exemption says
nothing of time or distance.
Mineral conservation one way or the other notwithstanding,
obviously Shell Oil Company gained and the state lost on the
decision of this case. And, equally obviously, the decision could
have gone the other way without gnat-straining. The failure of
the legislature to make its intentions clear, however honorable,
is once again indicated. Statutory drafting is difficult, but a technical drafting bureau might help at least to make "clarifications"
clear enough to admit of unstrained judicial interpretation.
64. La. Act 284 of 1942, amending La. Act 24 of 1935 (2 E.S.) [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1946) §§ 8523, 8526, 8526(N)].
65. Ibid.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Mineral Unitization Orders
The constitutionality of the conservation commission's unitization orders was again sustained in Crichton v. Lee,1 against
the attack that the application of unitizing orders to leases in
force at the time of passage of the enabling statute2 was a taking
of property without due process of law. The unitizing orders
were held a valid application of the state's police power.3

Due Process of Law
For the purpose of clarity, the constitutional law issues
raised by Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Commissioners,4 were
discussed in the section dealing with administrative law.
Expropriation Proceedings
In Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Gondolf o, " the only
question involved was the placing of a fair value on the defendant's property in an expropriation proceeding. The plaintiff's
expert witnesses had valued the property at $989.00, but admitted
on cross examination that they had not considered the fact that
the street on which the property fronted was paved. The defendant testified that the plaintiff had previously offered twentyone hundred dollars for the property. The court sustained the
jury's award of twenty-five hundred dollars to the plaintiff, applying the rule that expert opinion is not conclusive, particularly
when the experts are shown not to have considered all factors.
It pointed out that plaintiff's willingness to buy the property at
twenty-one hundred dollars was an admission that the property
was worth that much. The verdict of the freeholder's jury "will
not be interfered with except in the case of gross or manifest
error."a
The same rule was applied in State v. Barbe7 wherein an
award of eight hundred dollars an acre for a right of way was
sustained. As usual in such cases, the testimony was highly con1. 209 La. 561, 25 So.(2d) 229 (1946).
2. La. Act 157 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 4741.11 et seq.].
3. See, in accord, Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576, 44

L.Ed. 729 (1900); Lilly v. Conservation Commissioner of Louisiana, 29 F.
Supp. 892 (E.D. La. 1939); Hunter Co., Inc. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So.(2d)

495 (1942), appeal dismissed 320 U.S. 222, 64 S.Ct. 19, 88 L.Ed. 5 (1943).
4. 209 La. 737, 25 So.(2d) 527 (1946).
5. 208 La. 1065, 24 So.(2d) 78 (1945).
6. 208 La. 1065, 1071, 24 So.(2d) 78, 80, citing City of Shreveport v. Pedro,
170 La. 351, 127 So. 865 (1930).
7. 209 La. 185, 24 So.(2d) 372 (1945).
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flicting: plaintiff's expert witnesses valued the land at about
two hundred dollars an acre; defendant's witnesses, mainly laymen, ranged up to fifteen hundred dollars an acre. The court
applied the well settled rules that assessed valuation may be
considered, but is not controlling since real estate is not assessed
at its market value; that the market value is what a willing
purchaser would pay a willing seller under ordinary and usual
circumstances; that the jury must consider all the evidence; that
lay opinion is admissible.
LEGISLATION

The most striking case in this field during the last term was
Standard Oil Company v. Collector of Revenue,8 discussed under
the heading of taxation,9 in order that the issues presented could
be more comprehensively analyzed.
In State v. Fuller,° the court affirmed the rule that the title
of a law "need not be a synopsis or index of its contents. It is
sufficient if the title indicates the general purpose of the law
without specifying each provision thereof."" The case held sufficient the title of the local option law, which was attacked because the title stated that alcoholic or intoxicating beverages
was defined in the body of the act, without setting forth any
definition. It is unfortunate that legislative redactors in this state
are not more familiar with the rule stated by the court; a considerable amount of verbosity and redundancy could profitably
be eliminated from the usual statutory title, adding to its clarity,
without any sacrifice due to doubts of constitutionality.
The argument was offered in Kotch v. Board of River Pilot
Commissioners2 that, because the river port pilotage system
provided by statute'8 for the Port of New Orleans could operate
only in certain parts of the state, the statute was therefore a
special or local law, requiring previous publication of notice of
the intention to apply for passage." The court held, in accord8. 27 So.(2d) 268 (La. 1946).
9. Supra p. 174.

10. 209 La. 523, 25 So.(2d) 83 (1946).
11. 209 IL

523, 526, 25 So.(2d) 83, 84. The case arose under La. Const. of

1921, Art. III, § 16, which provides that "Every law enacted by the Legislature
shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of such object." (Italics supplied.)

12. 209 La. 737, 25 So.(2d) 527 (1946).
13. La. Act 54 of 1908, as amended by La. Act 134 of 1942 [Dart's Stats.

(Supp. 1946) § 9154 et seq.].
14. IA. Conast. of 1921, Art. IV,

§ 6.
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ance with well established rules, that, where a law is general in
terms, the fact that the conditions on which it can operate can
prevail in only certain parts of the state does not make it a local
law. Nor did the fact that the legislature deemed it necessary to
regulate pilotage "On the Mississippi River, between Southport
and Pilot Town, but did not find it necessary to regulate pilotage
in other parts of the State"'" make the regulation a local or
special law. The statute affected all persons within a class, not
merely a part of a class.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Due Process and the River Pilots
A number of issues were presented by the attack of persons
denied pilots' licenses on the river port pilotage17 system 16 in
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners.
After holding under authority of rulings of the United States
Supreme Court that pilot regulations were within the legislative
power of the state,'" and that the state has the power to limit,
by licensing laws, the number and qualifications of those entitled
to follow the pilot's profession," the argument of plaintiffs that
the statute was unconstitutional on its face was rejected.
But plaintiffs argued also that the statute failed "to lay down
any rules for the Board to follow in the commissioning of pilots,
but, on the contrary,... vests in the Board arbitrary powers in
that connection," ' 20 and that, therefore, apparently, the act involved an unconstitutional delegation of power. Section 4 of the
act provides that the Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners,
created by the statute, shall hold examinations of applicants
under such rules and regulations and with such requirements as
the commissioners shall have provided, excluding, however, all
applicants who do not submit evidence of moral character, are
not voters of the state, or who have not served at least six months
apprenticeship. Taken as a whole, although the court does not
discuss the point, there is a policy implicit in such a statute,21
15. 209 La. 737, 761, 25 So.(2d) 527, 534 (1946).
16. La. Act 54 of 1908, as amended by La. Act 134 of 1942 [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1946) § 9154 et seq.].
17. 209 La. 737, 25 So.(2d) 527 (1946).
18. Ex parte McNeill, 80 U.S. 236, 20 L.Ed. 624 (1872) and the several
cases cited by the court, 209 La. 737, 747, 25 So.(2d) 527, 530 (1946).
19. See Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 25 S.Ct. 52, 49 L.Ed. 224 (1904).
20. 209 La. 737, 745, 25 So. (2d) 527, 529.
21. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892); Currin

v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 411 (1939); 11 Am. Jur. 948, §
234 (verbo "Constitutional Law").
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that of requiring reasonable professional competence. While it
might have been more desirable for the legislature to enact expressly a standard for the commissioners to follow, the system
set up does not award such arbitrary authority to the commissioners as would warrant a ruling that the statute unconstitu22
tionally delegates legislative power.
Although plaintiffs did not establish in their petition any
basis for holding the statute itself unconstitutional, they did
allege arbitrary and discriminatory action by the board of commissioners. Here they found themselves impaled on the clause
of Section 4 which provides that pilots shall be commissioned
only when there exists a necessity for more pilots. The court
found that plaintiffs had not alleged the need for additional
pilots, and, incidentally, that they had not alleged service of the
requisite six months apprenticeship.
Inasmuch as the case was tried on an exception of no cause
of action, it might be deemed that dismissal of the suit was based
on technical issues. But such does not appear to have been the
case. Plaintiffs almost undoubtedly asked for the usual "general
and equitable relief." Obviously, the court was warranted in
holding that there was no judicial mandate to determine a need
for more pilots. But, assuming the accuracy of the allegations of
plaintiff's petition, as is requisite on the trial of an exception of
no cause of action, it would appear that plaintiffs stated a cause
of action from the administrative law standpoint, unless barred
by their failure to allege "necessity" and six months apprenticeship. They alleged arbitrary action; if there was arbitrary action,
discriminatory against plaintiffs, in the awarding of licenses,
plaintiffs are entitled to relief. They alleged failure to hold examinations, to plaintiff's detriment-again a valid ground for relief.
If plaintiffs had proved their allegations, it would have been
conformable to the statute and to accepted constitutional and
administrative law principles, to order the board of commissioners, upon next making appointments, to hold examinations, to
test the plaintiffs together with other applicants, and to award
commissions in a non-discriminatory fashion. On the thesis
adopted by the court, no one, however arbitrary the action against
him, could find a remedy for board action in past examinations.
22. Cf. the famous case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064,
30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) and the many cases cited in 11 Am. Jur. 947, n. 3 (verbo
"Constitutional Law, § 234).
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Scope of Administrative Licensing Power
In the case of Uzzo v. Louisiana Real Estate Board,2 the
2
court held that the Department of Occupational Standards '
could not deny a real estate broker's license to a practising attorney on the ground that his vocation was that of an attorney,
"not that of Real Estate business." Since "the Board (now the
is expressly vested
Department of Occupational Standards)
with the power to make, prescribe and enforce any and all such
rules and regulations connected with the application for any
license, as shall be deemed necessary to administer and enforce
the provisions of this Act, '2 6 it is interesting to speculate whether
the department would have authority to adopt a regulation that
no licenses would be issued save to persons whose occupation
was the real estate business. Apparently, under the Uzzo case,
such a regulation would be deemed to be beyond the authority
of the board.Y
Due Process and the School Teachers
What should be the last instalment of the long judicial controversy of Hamberlinv. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,28 was
decided, on rehearing, June 14, 1946. The court gives a detailed
history of the proceedings, which began in 1941. In that suit, Mrs.
Hamberlin, a dismissed teacher, sought back wages for the school
years 1941-1942, and 1943-1944. As to the earlier period, the court
found that plaintiff had been unlawfully dismissed by the school
board, that its attempt to reinstate her by offering a different
position was ineffective, and that, therefore, her salary was due
plaintiff although she did not teach at all during that period.
In 1943, however, the supreme court had affirmed a judgment
of the district court ordering Mrs. Hamberlin reinstated.2 9 The
parish school superintendent notified Mrs. Hamberlin of reinstatement by letter, but she failed to report for work. This was
reported to the school board, which ordered a hearing on the
charge of wilful neglect of duty made by the superintendent.
23. 209 La. 787, 25 So. (2d) 593 (1946).
24. Acting under authority of La. Act 236 of 1920, as amended by La.
Act 175 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6558 et seq.].
25. By virtue of La. Act 13 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 6329 et
seq.].
26. La. Act 236 of 1920, § 11, as amended by La. Act 175 of 1936, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6558 et seq.].
27. Compare Work v. Mosier, 261 U.S. 352, 43 S.Ct. 389, 67 L.Ed. 693
(1923); Whitney v. Watson, 85 N.H. 238, 157 Atl. 78 (1931).
28. 27 So.(2d) 307 (La. 1946).
29. Hamberlin v. School Board, 205 La. 34, 16 So.(2d) 897 (1944).
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Notice of the hearing was sent by mail to Mrs. Hamberlin on
October 8, 1943. Mrs. Hamberlin did not appear at the hearing,
on January 4, 1944, but presented a petition protesting against
the hearing because the judgment ordering her reinstatement
had not become final. After hearing testimony, the school board
dismissed Mrs. Hamberlin for failure to report for duty.
Mrs. Hamberlin argued that she owed no duty to report, and
hence the dismissal was invalid, because she had not yet been
paid her full back wages under the prior judgment; because 'she
had not been properly reinstated since only the school board, not
the superintendent could lawfully reinstate her; because the attempted reinstatement was in bad faith, as shown by her subsequent dismissal; and because she had not been paid interest and
costs due under the prior judgment.
The court found that the school board had properly reinstated the plaintiff; that, since in the earlier proceeding it had
judicially acknowledged acquiescence in the judgment of the
district court, its action in reinstating Mrs. Hamberlin prior to
final judgment of the supreme court was not premature. A
formal resolution or reinstatement was unnecessary, since she
had never been legally discharged. The back salary had been
paid, except for part of the 1941-1942 school year. And the school
board was not bound to pay either interest or court costs because
no state agency can be compelled to pay such items unless provision is made for them by stipulation or by specific statutes.80
It should be noted that Mrs. Hamberlin decidedly had full
protection of her rights in the administrative proceedings. She
received full notice, a formal hearing, and was offered the right
to be heard. Wherever the bad faith lay in earlier proceedings,
the school board could not be stigmatized for the action in question in this case. Indeed, the court noted that during these later
proceedings Mrs. Hamberlin was absent from the state and remained absent, making no apparent effort to report for her
teaching duties. Although the earlier actions of the school board
were questionable, the proceedings involved in the present case
were in obvious compliance with the statutory31 and constitutional safeguards surrounding the administrative process.
The court allowed Mrs. Hamberlin the hitherto unpaid portion of the 1941-1942 term's wages. It is interesting that, in effect,
30. See Makofsky v. Department of Highways, 205 La. 1029, 18 So.(2d)
605 (1944), and the other cases cited by the court in 27 So.(2d) 307, 313.
31. See La. Act 58 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2267 et seq.].
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the court found that a teacher is obliged to report to work although her full back salary has not yet been paid. There was apparently no tender of this sum to Mrs. Hamberlin, and, under
the usual rules of obligations, she would appear not to be bound
to render performance until the amounts due her were paid. 2
However, the court may have felt that a less technical insistence
upon rights might be seemly in a school teacher, or that the
failure of Mrs. Hamberlin to report during later stages of the
cases justified overlooking the usual rules.
Authority of School Boards to Fix Bus Operator's Tenure
The rule that, prior to Act 61 of 1942," a school board was
without authority to fix by resolution or contract the term for a
bus operator was affirmed in Brown v. Vernon Parish School
Board." The court noted that the legislature altered this rule,
after the decision of Potts v. Morehouse Parish School Board,"
by adopting the act of 1942,36 which, as amended, provides bus
operators tenure after a three year probationary period.
School Board Quorum
The statutory tenure provisions" were again involved in
Miller v. Rapides Parish School Board.38 Although other issues
were raised, the court resolved the case by holding that only a
majority of the total membership of the school board, not a
majority of those present at a particular meeting, could discharge
a bus operator. This result was reached by considering the legislative intention, as manifested by the many safeguards for bus
operators placed in the tenure act. The requirement that a majority of the full board act, not merely a majority of a quorum,
would be highly significant in other situations if the court had
not by its language correctly restricted the rule to the particular
statute involved.
Challenge of School Bond Elections
In Gough v. LaSalle Parish School Board," a suit to challenge an election for the issuance of school bonds was dismissed
32. See Arts. 1913, 1933, La. Civil Code of 1870.
33. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2248.
34. 209 La. 725, 25 So.(2d) '447 (1946).
35. 177 La. 1103, 150 So. 290, 91 A.L.R. 1093 (1933). Accord: Poole v. La
Salle Parish School Board, 183 So. 182 (La. App. 1938). Contra: Newchurch
v. Ascension Parish School Board, 161 So. 889 (La. App. 1936).
36. La. Act 185 of 1944. For the statute, as presently in force, see Dart's
Stats.,(Supp. 1946) § 2248.
37. Ibid.
38. 209 LA. 877, 25 So.(2d) 623 (1946).
39. 27 So.(2d) 330 (La. 1946).
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because it was filed more than sixty days after the date of the
election. The sixty day prescriptive period is established by the
Louisiana Constitution, "° and by statute,' 1 and the application
of the provision is well settled by the many cases cited by the
court. "2
Right to Discharge Employees of Department of Education
Jackson v. Coxe- essentially involved the sole question of
whether it is the State Superintendent of Public Education or
the State Board of Education who has authority to discharge
employees of the State Department of Education. The dispute
revolved about Act 100 of 1922,44 which invests the Board with
4 5 while
authority "to provide" the employees of the Department,
directing the superintendent to "select the employees of the various divisions."4" Neither this act nor the other statutory provisions considered by the court mentioned discharge.
The majority of the court decided that he who selects should
discharge, as against the contention that he who provides should
discharge. Justice Hamiter, in a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Fournet and Hawthorne joined, concluded that the
words were ambiguous and that ultimate control was vested in
the Board, rather than in the superintendent.
The question is of course important. But a statute which
creates a state department leaving so basic a question as the
authority to hire and fire employees capable of decision only by
an exercise in semantics is obviously poorly drafted. Presentation
of such statutory material breeds undesirable uncertainty and
results in struggles like Jackson v. Coxe where a basic question
f departmental organization was decided in a wage claim. The
ourt is left in the intricacies of ambiguity to decide a question
vhich should never have been presented at all had competent
Iraftsmanship been employed in framing the statutory material.
['he present work of the Louisiana State Law Institute in recom)iling the Louisiana statutes should be of material assistance in
lleviating such problems in the future.
,evees and Levee Districts

A review of the history of the creation and development of
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 14(n).
La. Act 46 of 1921 (E.S.), § 43 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 88961.
27 So.(2d) 330, 332 (La. 1946).
208 La. 715, 23 So.(2d) 312 (1945).
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2220 et seq.
La. Act 100 of 1922, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2222].
Id. at § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2222].
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levee districts in Louisiana was presented in Dickson v. Board
of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District.," In that case the
plaintiff, a riparian owner, part of whose plantation was exposed
to the Red River by the action of the levee board in constructing
two "cut-off" levees, sought compensation for the taking of his
property. The owner sought to avoid the constitutional limitation of damages to the assessed tax valuation of his property 8
by allegations that the locations of the two "cut-off" levees were
fixed with the purpose of protecting other private property, and
that, since the levees did not follow the meander of the river,
the taking was not for a levee purpose within the meaning of
the constitutional4 9 and statutory" provisions.
The court held that levee boards, with the assistance and
under the supervision of the Department of Public Works,51 have
the "greatest possible latitude in locating ...levees and in de-

termining the mode and place of building them.... These boards
are not compelled to follow the meanderings of streams.... The
action of these governmental agencies in locating, building, and
maintaining levees is jurisdictional and is not subject to review
unless there has been some palpable abuse." 2
The conclusion of the court is in accordance with judicial
precedent 8 and with obviously sound engineering principles.
The construction of levees at the immediate edge of a shifting
or caving river bank would afford little or no flood protection.
In cases where the nature or course of the river or stream on
which levees are being constructed dictates a straightened or
distant levee, the constitutional limitation on damages recoverable by riparian owners should not be avoided simply because
of the public need to rely upon sound engineering principles in
levee construction. Of course there is hardship on the riparian
owner, but, as the court notes, this hardship is a lawful one, of
long history and respectable origin.
47. 26 So.(2d)
herein, p. 240.

474 (La. 1946).

Other aspects of this case are discussed

48. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XVI, § 6.
49. Ibid.

50. La. Act 7 of 1884 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6856-6857].
51. See La. Act 2 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 6753 et seq.].
52. 26 So.(2d) 474, 480 (La. 1946).
53. See Dubose v. The Levee Commissioners, 11 La. Ann. 165 (1856); Peart
v. Meeker, 45 La. Ann. 421, 12 So. 490 (1893). See also Boyce Cottonseed Oil

Mfg. Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Red River, 160 La. 727, 107 So. 506
(1926); Mayer v. Board of Commissioners for Caddo Levee District, 177 La.
1119, 150 So. 295 (1933). See also Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U. S. 452, 16 S.Ct.
345, 40 L.Ed. 490 (1896).
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ELECTION

Estoppel of Defeated Candidate
Another defeated candidate brought a suit to contest an
election in State ex rel. Bowden v. Blackman. 4 The relator, defeated in a mayoralty second primary election, sought a recount
and alleged alternatively illegality of the method of selection of
the commissioners and watchers. The recount brought substantially the same result as the original count, and relator did not
contest this on appeal, but contended instead that Act 46 of 1940",
was incorrectly followed in selecting commissioners and watchers
in the second primary.
The court distinguished State ex rel. Rosenstock v. The
Democratic Executive Committee of the Town of Westwego 6
as involving a first primary (in which case Act 97 of 192251 was
held to govern). Section 78 of Act 46 of 194058 expressly provides
for the method of selection meticulously followed by the municipal election committee in the Bowden case. The relator contended, however, that the section failed to provide that the committee should issue the commissions to watchers and commissioners as well as select them. To imply the mere ministerial
function of issuing commissions from the other detailed powers
given in Section 78 was of no difficulty.
But, contended the relator, he had no notice of the selections
made in advance of these selections. The court found it sufficient
notice that the date and place for the selection meeting was set
by statute, thus following a well settled rule.59
At any rate, as the court indicated, the relator was probably
estopped to contest the election on the grounds here raised. He
was notified of the selections thirteen days before the second
primary; he expressed his satisfaction with them by a letter to
the municipal executive committee; and he failed to avail himself
of his summary remedy under Section 101 of the 1940 act. "He
could not withhold his protest until the election determined
whether he or his opponent received a majority of the votes cast,
accepting the nomination if successful and instituting suit to
6 0°
annul the election if unsuccessful.
54. 208 La. 475, 23 So.(2d)

188 (1945).

55. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2682.5-2682.102.
56. 197 La. 469, 1 So.(2d) 697 (1941), noted in (1941)
Rivmw 252.

4 LOUISIANA LAW

57. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2651-2682.4.
58. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2682.79.
59. See 42 Am. Jur. 455, § 120, vo "Public Administrative Law."
60. 208 La. 475, 488, 23 So.(2d) 188, 192 (1945).
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Robert W. Williams*
The always interesting question of the licensing and regulatory authority of a municipality was submitted to the supreme
court in the case of Chalmiers v. City of Shreveport," in which
case Section 3, subsection d, paragraph 2, of Ordinance No. 30 of
1936 of the City of Shreveport, was attacked as being unconstitutional. This provision set forth the qualifications of an insurance
or surety company issuing indemnity bonds required by the ordinance for conducting or carrying on a public transportation service in the municipality. However, before final decision the defendant municipality moved to remand the case to the lower
court for a showing that the question involved had become moot.
The case originally was a mandamus proceeding whereby relator
had attempted to have the court force the city to grant him a
license to operate a taxicab service, but in the motion to remand
it was alleged by the city that the relator had filed another petition with the city counsel of Shreveport for a certificate authorizing him to operate a taxi service, and that the municipal
counsel had accepted the petition. The supreme court ordered
the remand of the case for a showing of the facts alleged, and
pointed out that if those facts were correct the question before
the court would have become moot and the appeal would have
to be dismissed at a later date.
State ex rel. Fitzmaurice v. Clay2 involved an application
for mandamus against the municipal authorities of the City of
Opelousas to compel them to issue to relator a building permit
for the erection of a gasoline filling station on property owned
by him in the municipality. The city clerk's refusal to issue the
building permit was based upon an action taken almost a year
before by the board of alderman of the city, in which he instructed the clerk not to issue the permit for commercial building
within the area where relator's property was situated until
certain contemplated action had been taken by the board relative to zoning this particular area. It was intended that a zoning
commission would study the petition of certain property owners
and would report to the board of alderman as to the desirability
of a zoning ordinance. Relator applied for his permit almost one
*Member,

Baton Rouge

Bar; Part-time Assistant

Louisiana State University.
1. 208 La. 310, 23 So. (2d) 103 (1945).
2. 208 La. 443, 23 So. (2d) 177 (1945).

Professor of Law,
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year after the filing of the petition by the property owners and
the zoning commission did not make final report to the board of
alderman until after relator's application had been refused and
this suit filed. The board of aldermen had never passed a zoning
ordinance restricting the erection of commercial businesses in
this area. The court recognized the fact that a property owner
had no vested right or interest to a building permits and pointed
out that if a valid zoning ordinance had been adopted by the city
before the rendition of judgment in the lower court, the relief
sought could not have been granted. However, the court held
that in the absence of a valid zoning ordinance the relator was
entitled to a permit.
The defendants made the further point that they had not
denied relator's permit, but had merely deferred action on it
until such time that the zoning commission could make its final
report and a valid ordinance be adopted. The court felt, however,
that the long lapse of time from the initial action of the board
of aldermen was tantamount to a refusal to grant the permit. In4
vestigating the language of the zoning ordinance of Opelousas,
the court found that the mayor was under a ministerial duty to
issue the building permit and hence mandamus would lie. The
writ was accordingly made peremptory.
One of the interesting features about the case is that the
relator had not fulfilled all formal prerequisites in his application, but the court passed over the defects of form, stating that
even had there been strict compliance with such requisites the
board of aldermen would still have denied his permit and, therefore, the defects became unimportant. 5
In Smith v. Town of Vinton,' plaintiff, an electrical contractor, filed suit alleging that he had entered into a verbal contract
with the mayor of defendant to furnish labor and materials necessary in the repair of the electrical distribution system owned
and operated by the municipality. He further alleged that the
mayor, at the time of the agreement, represented that he was
duly authorized to make the contract, and further, that an emergency existed because of the fact that the system was in a dangerous condition. Pursuant to the contract plaintiff undertook
3. See State ex rel. Manhein v. Harrison, 164 La. 564, 114 So. 159 (1927).
4. Ordinance No. 3 of 1923.
5. It should be noted that the adoption of a valid ordinance before the

decision of the case on appeal will not serve to require the reopening or remanding of the case. State ex rel. Holcombe v. City of Lake Charles, 175
La. 803, 144 So. 502 (1932).
6. 209 La. 587, 25 So. (2d) 237 (1946).
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the work but was forced to sop because of the failure of defendant to make any of the agreed payments. It was further alleged
that the members of the town counsel witnessed the performance
of the work, knew that the repairs were being made, knew that
the emergency existed, knew that the mayor had entered into
the contract with plaintiff and that no objection had been offered
by any of them. The defendant filed exceptions of no right or
cause of action and plaintiff appealed from a judgment sustaining the said exceptions.
The first argument of the defendant was that the mayor had
not obtained the consent of the State Bond and Tax Board for
the incurring of the debt as required by Act 6 of the Second
Extra Session of the Legislature of 1935. This statute declares
null any contract, debt, obligation, bond, or other evidence of
indebtedness whatsoever, incurred or issued by any political
subdivision without the consent and approval of such board.
The court disposed of this objection by saying that Act 136
of the Louisiana Legislature of 1898 authorized municipalities to
own and operate an electrical distribution system and, therefore,
the cost of maintaining such system in good repair and operating
condition was not an unusual undertaking on the part of the
municipality, but was within the ordinary and usual course of
the town's administration. In view of this fact the court held that
the act did not apply, and hence was not a true restriction upon
the incurring of the obligation in this case.
The defendant next urged noncompliance with Act 73 of the
Louisiana Legislature of 1926, as amended, which provides for
the letting of all public work contracts to the lowest responsible
bidder after advertisement. The court found such contention untenable because the terms of the statute itself provided that
"the procedure set forth herein shall not be necessary in cases of
extreme public emergency or for labor necessary and used in
the maintenance of public works built and completed."
The defendant further contended that the petition did not
allege that the board of aldermen had authorized the mayor's
entering into the agreement with the plaintiff. The court expressly recognized that as a general rule a mayor acting alone
is without power to execute a contract incurring a debt on the
part of his city or town unless he acts under the authority of the
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town council. However, the court here invoked the doctrine of
estoppel to point out that, since the petition alleged that the
members of the town council knew of the agreement and the
work performed under that agreement and made no objection,
they would be estopped from denying the validity of the contract.
Finally, the city argued that no municipal debt could be required to be paid unless the provisions of Revised Statute Section 24487 had been complied with. The court again held that
this particular section did not apply to those expenses or obligations arising in the ordinary course of administration, therefore,
the exceptions were overruled and the case remanded for further
proceedings.
Adam v. Town of Leesville is the report of consolidated
suits by certain property owners in Leesville, Louisiana, attacking a street paving contract between defendants, Town of Leesville and W. R. Aldridge and Company, alleging that the board
of aldermen of the town violated mandatory provisions of Section 4 of Act 92 of 1934 by considering the bids submitted and
by awarding the contract in "closed session." The board had
advertised for bids for the paving of five streets. The only bid
that was presented was made by W. R. Aldridge Company. Upon
the receipt of this bid the board of aldermen went into secret
executive session and upon its adjournment emerged with a
proposal to pave only three streets. This proposal was accepted
by the defendant Aldridge Company. The court held that this
was a material departure from the initial proposal made by the
city and that the public had not been given a notice of the time
and place at which protests might be made. The court pointed
out that more protests might have been received if it had been
known publicly that only three streets were to be paved instead
of the proposed five. Furthermore, they held that the contract as
awarded did not meet the requirements that the contract as let
should conform substantially with the proposal advertised, nor
did the proceeding comply with the mandatory provision of
Section 4 of Act 92 of 1934 which provides for the opening of
bids and awarding of contracts by the governing authorities of
7. Section 2448 requires that provision for payment of a debt be made
by a municipality before the contraction thereof.
& 210 La. 106, 26 So. (2d) 370 (1946).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VII

the municipality while in open session. Under those circumstances
the contract was declared to be null and void.
One of the consolidated suits had for its object the enjoining
of the city from letting the contract to pave one of the streets.
This contract had been entered into after some of the suits were
filed. It was the argument of the taxpayer that the city could not
lawfully award a contract to another person to pave this particular street when the initial contractor was still insisting upon his
rights to be allowed to perform under that contract. The court
held that the situation was so confused that an injunction, which
[the court pointed out] is equitable in its nature, had correctly
issued in the trial ourt; but [the court now felt that] since they
had announced the nullity of the initial contract, there was no
further reason for maintaining the injunction which prevented
the execution of a lawful contract for the paving of one of the
city's streets, and dismissed said suit as of a nonsuit. The case
seems imminently fair and correct in all points.
0
Ridge Park, Incorporatedv. Police Jury of Jefferson Parish,
was a suit by a development corporation to have -declared null
and void an ordinance adopted by the Police Jury of Jefferson
Parish which abandoned and closed Fairmont Drive, a street in
the rear of a subdivision adjoining plaintiff's tract of land. The
plaintiff further requested a preliminary injunction restraining
and enjoining any interference with its use of this street for highway and road purposes. Exceptions of no cause or right of action
were filed and the trial judge rendered judgment maintaining
these exceptions, denying plaintiff's right to the injunctive relief, and dismissing plaintiff's suit. On appeal, the court pointed
out the obvious error in this proceeding by stating that the trial
court could not dismiss plaintiff's suit on an application for a
preliminary injunction. It is well settled that a hearing on the
merits must be had before a dismissal can be entered. 10 The court
then considered the question whether the petition stated such a
cause of action as would warrant the court's granting of the injunctive relief sought pending a hearing of the case on its merits.
The court found that under the allegations of the petition plaintiff was not entitled to such relief because the street had already
been closed and hence an injunction would not afford plaintiff
the relief actually sought.

9. 27 So. (2d) 128 (La. 1946).
10. American National Bank v. Bauman, 173 La. 336, 137 So. 54 (1931).
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Towm of DeQuincy v. Wood" was a suit by the municipality
to enforce the local assessment of a town lot for the paving of a
street and its sidewalks. This action was defended by the property owner on the theory that there was a strip of ground belonging to the city dedicated to street purposes of fifteen feet and
nine inches which lay between the paved portion of the street
and his front property line. In other words, the city owned a
strip of ground seventy feet wide, but utilized only thirty-eight
feet and six inches of this strip for its street improvement. The
defense therefore was that the defendant's lot did not abut upon
the street as constructed and hence he was not responsible for
the assessment which was placed against his property. Judgment
was given in favor of plaintiff and defendant appealed to the
supreme court. Chief Justice O'Niell, in discussing the jurisdiction of the court, correctly decided that this case was properly
12
appealed to the supreme court.
In discussing the meaning of t h e phrase "abutting the
streets," Chief Justice O'Niell adopted a realistic attitude and
held that the defendant's property abutted the street even
though it did not abut that part of the street which the pavement actually covered.
Justice Hamiter wrote a well reasoned dissenting opinion
supported by very persuasive authority to the effect that if the
city maintains a neutral ground of any material width then the
taxpayer's property does not actually abut on the street and
hence no local assessment may be made.
However, as a practical matter, it appears that the Chief
Justice's liberal interpretation of the wording of the statute more
clearly reaches the intendment of the legislature, and certainly
the result is desirable in that the various municipalities throughout the state are left with discretion as to the width of their
streets, and the width of the actual pavement on those streets.
The result desired by Justice Hamiter would, it is submitted,
work too great a restriction on the municipal exercise of discretion necessary to adequate street and sidewalk improvement.
11. 27 So. (2d) 314 (La. 1946).
12. Article 7, § 10 (5), of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 authorizes an
appeal to the supreme court in all cases wherein the constitutionality or
legality of a tax or local assessment is involved. Many cases are cited to
sustain the proposition that if a judicial interpretation of the tax statute is
necessary to determine whether the tax demanded was legally levied upon
the defendant, the legality of the tax statute is contested and the supreme
court has appellate jurisdiction.

